Jack Balkin

For Example, a constitutional revolution occurred following the New Deal because Franklin Roosevelt was able to appoint eight new Supreme Court Justices between 1937 and 1941.

Balkin and Levinson's theory contrasts with Bruce Ackerman's theory of constitutional moments, which argues that constitutional revolutions occur because of self-conscious acts of democratic mobilization that establish new standards of political legitimacy.

Balkin and Levinson view partisan entrenchment as roughly but imperfectly democratic; it guarantees neither legitimate nor correct constitutional interpretation.

Jack M. Balkin (born August 13, 1956) is an American legal scholar.

He is the Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment at Yale Law School.

Balkin is the founder and director of the Yale Information Society Project (ISP), a research center whose mission is "to study the implications of the Internet, telecommunications, and the new information technologies for law and society."

He also directs the Knight Law and Media Program and the Abrams Institute for Free Expression at Yale Law School.

Balkin publishes a legal blog, Balkinization, and is also a correspondent for The Atlantic.

He is a scholar of Constitutional and First Amendment law.

In addition to his work as a legal scholar, he has also written a book on memes and cultural evolution and has translated and written a commentary on the ancient Chinese Book of Changes, or I Ching.

Born in Kansas City, Missouri, Balkin received his A.B. and J.D. degrees from Harvard University and his Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Cambridge.

He clerked for Judge Carolyn Dineen King of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

From 1982 to 1984 he was a litigation associate at the New York law firm of Cravath, Swaine & Moore.

He taught at the University of Missouri at Kansas City from 1984 to 1988 and at the University of Texas from 1988 to 1994.

He joined the Yale faculty in 1994.

He has also taught at Harvard University, New York University, Tel Aviv University, and Queen Mary College at the University of London.

Balkin's 1998 book, Cultural Software: A Theory of Ideology, argued that ideology could be explained in terms of memes and processes of cultural evolution.

He argued that ideology is an effect of the "cultural software" or tools of understanding that become part of human beings and that are produced through the evolution and transmission of memes.

At the same time, Balkin argued that all ideological and moral analysis presupposes a transcendent ideal of truth and "a transcendent value of justice."

Like T. K. Seung, he suggests that a transcendent idea of justice—although incapable of perfect realization and inevitably "indeterminate"—underlies political discourse and political persuasion.

Balkin coined the term ideological drift to describe a phenomenon by which ideas and concepts change their political valence as they are introduced into new social and political contexts over time.

Along with Duncan Kennedy, Balkin developed the field of legal semiotics.

Legal semiotics shows how legal arguments feature recurrent tropes or topoi that respond to each other and whose opposition is reproduced at higher and lower levels of doctrinal detail as legal doctrines evolve.

Hence Balkin claimed that legal argument has a self-similar "crystalline" or fractal structure.

Balkin employed deconstruction and related literary theories to argue that legal thought was structured in terms of "nested oppositions"—opposed ideas or concepts that turn into each other over time or otherwise depend on each other in novel and unexpected ways.

Although he draws on literary theory in his work on legal rhetoric, Balkin and his frequent co-author Sanford Levinson contend law is best analogized not to literature but to the performing arts such as music and drama.

Balkin and Levinson argue that constitutional revolutions in judicial doctrine occur through a process called partisan entrenchment.

The party that controls the White House can stock the federal courts with new judges and Justices who have views on key constitutional issues roughly similar to those of the President.

This shifts the median Justice on the Supreme Court and changes the complexion of the lower federal courts, which, in turn, eventually affects constitutional doctrine.

If enough new judges are appointed in a relatively short period of time, changes will occur more quickly, producing a constitutional revolution.

He was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2005, and a Member of the American Law Institute in 2020.

Balkin's constitutional theory, developed in his 2011 book, Living Originalism, is both originalist and living constitutionalist.

He argues that there is no contradiction between these approaches, properly understood.

Interpreters must follow the original meaning of the constitutional text but not its original expected application; hence much constitutional interpretation actually involves constitutional construction and state building by all three branches of government.

Balkin's "framework originalism" views the Constitution as an initial framework for governance that sets politics in motion and makes politics possible; it must be filled out over time through constitutional construction and state building.

This process of building out the Constitution is living constitutionalism.

Balkin uses the term "constitutional rot" to describe the process by which democracies become less responsive to public will and less devoted to the public good over time.

Constitutional rot grows because of (1) increasing inequalities of income and wealth; (2) increasing political polarization and tribalism; (3) loss of trust between members of different parties and between the public and established institutions; and (4) policy disasters that show that government officials are not competent and/or cannot be trusted.

Balkin argues that the framers of the U.S. Constitution believed that all republics would decay over time, and they designed the Constitution so that it could ride out periods of constitutional rot in the hopes of a later renewal of republican institutions.

Many of the Constitution's features, including staggered terms for the President, House, and Senate, separation of powers, federalism, and an independent judiciary, are forms of "republican insurance" designed to achieve this goal.