Dino Brugioni

Dino Antonio Brugioni (December 16, 1921 – September 25, 2015) was a former senior official at the CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC).

He was an imagery analyst and also served as NPIC's Chief of Information.

During his 35-year career, Brugioni helped establish imagery intelligence (IMINT) as a national asset to solve intelligence problems.

Even after retirement, Brugioni was considered to be the world's foremost imagery intelligence analyst.

After retirement, he was active in encouraging the use of declassified photographic intelligence for historical research.

His book, Eyeball to Eyeball

is an extensive unclassified history of US imagery intelligence.

He joined the CIA in March 1948 and became an expert in Soviet industries.

In 1955, he was selected as a member of the cadre of the newly formed Photographic Intelligence Division that would interpret U-2, SR-71 and satellite photography.

The American U-2 spy plane began flights over Russia in 1956.

Under the cover of an abandoned Washington car dealership, the first CIA analysts were assembled to review the U-2's photos.

The founding analysts included Dino Brugioni and small team of World War II photo interpreters, under the direction of Art Lundahl.

Analysis of U-2 photography dispelled the "bomber gap" in 1956 and the "missile gap" in 1961.

Analysis was also conducted on U-2 photography taken during the Suez, Lebanon, Chinese Off-Shore Islands, Middle East and Tibetan crises.

In January 1961, Lundahl's CIA group acquired military imagery intelligence capabilities

to form the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), as a part of the CIA Directorate of Science and Technology.

Brugioni was a key deputy to Lundahl.

His first assignments included counting Russian bombers, finding new Soviet airbases and assessing Russian naval readiness.

He then was intimately involved in the Cuban Missile Crisis (see below)

U-2 photographs taken on October 14, 1962, by some of the first U-2 aircraft piloted by US Air Force members rather than CIA personnel, brought back photographs, in which the NPIC analysts found visual evidence of the placement of Soviet SS-4 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM), capable of hitting targets, in the continental United States, with nuclear warheads.

This triggered the Cuban Missile Crisis, sending the US intelligence community into maximum effort and triggering an unprecedented military alert.

The October 14 high-altitude photographs, taken from the periphery of Cuba, led to the US taking the additional risk of direct overflights of Cuba, at the orders of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara.

McNamara, Chief of Naval Operations George Whelan Anderson Jr. and Lundahl concurred that the US Navy's Light Photographic Squadron VFP-62, flying F8U-1P Crusader fighters in a reconnaissance role, were best qualified to take low-level photographs, flying directly over Cuba.

As well as the U-2 photographs, the low-level Navy photographs also streamed into NPIC, where Brugioni and colleagues analyzed them around the clock.

described Lundahl's presenting the October 14 photographs and their interpretation to President John F. Kennedy: "Mr. Lundahl, when Kennedy was shown the photographs, he turned his head, looked at Lundahl, and said, "Are you sure?" And Mr. Lundahl said, "I'm as sure of this, Mr. President, as we can be sure of anything in the photo interpretation field.

And you must admit that we have not led you astray on anything that we have reported to you previously." And the President said "Okay.""

Brugioni's book, although a general history, deals extensively with the role of imagery intelligence in the Cuban Missile Crisis.

A selection of the actual photographs, as well as supporting data such as the chart of CIA photo are at the George Washington University National Security Archive.

Another source on technique, discussing the obscure technique of "crateology", or recognizing the characteristic ways in which the Soviets crated military equipment, is Hilsman's To Move a Nation.

A photograph analyzed using the crateology technique is shown in.

Later assignments included finding chemical and nuclear weapons, missile sites and test blast areas.

He provided intelligence to policymakers during World War II, the Cold War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War and the Yom Kippur War.

In a video interview by Doug Horne (actually a digest of excerpts from 9 interviews by Peter Janney and Doug Horne), Dino Brugioni says that he and his team examined the 8mm Zapruder film of the John F. Kennedy assassination the evening of Saturday 23 November 1963 and into the morning of Sunday 24 November 1963, when he was the weekend duty officer at the CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Center.

Dino and his team projected the film for two members of the Secret Service several times, and they indicated which frames they wanted prints made from, which in turn should be included on the briefing boards.

Dino indicated in the interview that he was positive that they had the original film, and that when they projected it for the two members of the Secret Service, it was the first time they had viewed the film.

After creating the required duplicate negatives from the desired frames, the film was returned the two members of the Secret Service, and that at approximately 3 AM they left the NPIC facility.

He and his team then made up two identical sets of briefing boards, one set for CIA Director John McCone and one for the Secret Service, but both were eventually delivered to the CIA Director who would in turn provide a set to the Secret Service.

Brugioni flew in the 66th Bomb Squadron and a number of reconnaissance missions in World War II over North Africa, Italy, Germany, Yugoslavia and France.

He received the Purple Heart, 9 Air Medals and a Distinguished Unit Citation.

After the war, he received BA and MA degrees in Foreign Affairs from George Washington University.