David Elazar

David "Dado" Elazar (דוד אלעזר; 27 August 1925 – 15 April 1976) was the ninth Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), serving in that capacity from 1972 to 1974.

He was forced to resign in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War.

David (Dado) Elazar was born in Sarajevo, Yugoslavia, to a family of Sephardic heritage.

He emigrated to Palestine in 1940 with the Youth Aliyah program and settled on kibbutz Ein Shemer.

He soon joined the Palmach and fought in many important battles during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, including the Battle of San Simon Monastery in Jerusalem.

As a soldier, he advanced through the ranks, eventually serving as commander of the famous HaPortzim Battalion of the Harel Brigade.

Elazar remained in the army after the war, transferring to the armored corps following the 1956 Sinai campaign.

In 1957, Israel was forced, under American pressure, to withdraw from the Sinai which it had occupied since attacking Egypt the previous year.

He served as deputy to the commander of the corps, Haim Bar Lev, taking over as commander of the armored corps in 1961.

He remained in this position until 1964, when he was appointed Chief of the Northern Command, a position he held until 1969.

During the Six-Day War of 1967 he was a crucial advocate for the occupation of the strategic Golan Heights, which was then a part of Syria, and he oversaw the capture in just two days.

After the war, Elazar served as the chief operations officer on the general staff.

Closing the Tiran strait to Israeli ships by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1967 was one of the major causes for the 1967 war, during which Israel re-occupied the Sinai peninsula.

On 1 January 1972, he was appointed Chief of Staff.

The first months of his tenure were spent combating terrorism.

On 30 May, the Japanese Red Army killed 25 civilians and wounded 71 more at an attack on Lod Airport, Israel's leading transportation hub (see: Lod Airport Massacre).

On 5 September of that year, another group attacked Israeli athletes at the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich.

The attack became known as the Munich Massacre.

In response to these attacks, Elazar ordered what was, until then, the largest strike against Palestinian bases in Syria and Lebanon.

Three Syrian jets were downed, and dozens of fedayeen were killed in a heavy artillery barrage.

In Operation Spring of Youth, which took place on the night of 9–10 April 1973, dozens more Palestinians, including several key Palestinian leaders, were assassinated in Beirut by the IDF.

One of the decisions made by Elazar during his tenure was the order to down a Libyan passenger jet that strayed into Israeli airspace and was suspected to be on a terrorist mission when it did not respond.

The plane was shot down by the Israeli Air Force over the Sinai Peninsula under direct orders from Elazar, killing over 100 civilians.

Only later was it discovered that this was a civilian aircraft that had made a navigational error.

On 27 May 1973, the IDF announced a state of emergency and reserve troops were called up in response to a movement of Egyptian troops.

The state of emergency was cancelled when it became clear that this was only an exercise.

This event had a major impact on the General Staff, as it led them to believe that the Egyptian forces were not preparing for war, later that year, on Yom Kippur.

After the war however, it became apparent that these frequent maneuvers carried out by the Egyptians were part of an elaborate ruse meant to induce complacency in the Israelis regarding the true intentions of Egyptian troop movements at the time the actual attack took place.

On 13 September, Israel shot down thirteen Syrian fighter jets, which had attempted to down Israeli aircraft.

On 1 October 1973, the armies of Egypt and Syria were placed on alert.

Due to an erroneous intelligence assessment and poor decisions by the Israeli military, the IDF responded with only limited measures, few reserve units were called up, and it was determined that war was "unlikely."

In the early hours of 6 October (on Yom Kippur, the holiest of the Jewish holidays), Elazar finally became convinced that war would indeed break out that same day, even though the Chief of Military Intelligence Major General Eli Zeira and the Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan still believed that this was highly unlikely.

Dayan's conviction had two major consequences:

At 2:00 p.m. on Yom Kippur, the armies of Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated attack against Israel.

In many ways, this came as a surprise to the IDF and its command.

After a series of fierce battles to block the invading armies, a failed counter-offensive in the Sinai, and heavy losses to Israel's airforce and ground troops alike, the incursion was finally halted.

On 11 October, fighting in the north was pushed back across the Syrian frontier, and on 16 October, Israeli troops crossed the Suez Canal under the command of General Ariel Sharon.

In the early days of the fighting, Elazar was one of very few Israeli commanders who managed to keep his cool and even maintain an optimistic view of where events were heading.

This was in especially sharp contrast with the political leadership, most notably Moshe Dayan, who spoke of the "destruction of the Third Jewish Commonwealth."

At the same time, the war highlighted sharp personal differences among the top military brass, particularly along the Southern Front—some of these differences have yet to be resolved.