Anatoliy Golitsyn

Anatoliy Mikhaylovich Golitsyn CBE (Russian: Анатолий Михайлович Голицын; 25 August 1926 – 29 December 2008) was a Soviet KGB defector and author of two books about the long-term deception strategy of the KGB leadership.

He was born in Pyriatyn, USSR.

He provided "a wide range of intelligence to the CIA on the operations of most of the 'Lines' (departments) at the Helsinki and other residencies, as well as KGB methods of recruiting and running agents."

During his time as president of the Board of Trade in the late 1940s, Wilson had been on trade missions to Russia and cultivated a friendship with Anastas Mikoyan and Vyacheslav Molotov.

He continued these relationships when Labour went into Opposition, and according to material from the Mitrokhin Archive, his insights into British politics were passed to and highly rated by the KGB.

An "agent development file" was opened in the hope of recruiting Wilson, and the codename "OLDING" was given to him.

However "the development did not come to fruition," according to the KGB file records.

Golitsyn also accused the KGB of poisoning Hugh Gaitskell, Wilson's predecessor as leader of the Labour Party, in order for Wilson to take over the party.

Golitsyn further said that Kekkonen had been a KGB agent codenamed "Timo" since 1947.

Most Finnish historians believe that Kekkonen was closely connected with the KGB, but the matter remains controversial.

Golitsyn had said from the very beginning that the KGB would send a false defector to the US to try to discredit him.

In 1961 under the name "Ivan Klimov" he was assigned to the Soviet embassy in Helsinki, Finland, as vice counsel and attaché.

He defected with his wife and daughter to the Central Intelligence Agency via Helsinki on 15 December 1961.

They flew "with a CIA escort from Finland to Sweden and thence to the United States via Frankfurt am Main, Germany, arriving on 18 December 1961".

He was interviewed by James Jesus Angleton, CIA counter-intelligence director.

Thus, Golitsyn's defection in 1961 set in motion the process that definitively confirmed Philby as a Soviet mole.

Golitsyn was a figure of significant controversy in the Western intelligence community.

The military writer General Sir John Hackett and former CIA counter-intelligence director James Angleton identified Golitsyn as "the most valuable defector ever to reach the West".

However, the official historian for MI5, Christopher Andrew, described him as an "unreliable conspiracy theorist".

Andrew believes that although intelligence data provided by Golitsyn were reliable, some of his global political assessments of the Soviet and KGB strategy are questionable.

In particular, he disputed the Golitsyn claim that the "Sino-Soviet split was a charade to deceive the West".

Golitsyn said that Harold Wilson (then prime minister of the United Kingdom) was a KGB informer and an agent of influence.

This encouraged pre-existing conspiracy theories within the British security services concerning Wilson.

Golitsyn said after his defection that the Note Crisis of 1961 was an operation masterminded by Finnish president Urho Kekkonen together with the Soviets to ensure Kekkonen's re-election.

In January 1962, the KGB sent instructions to Rezidentura throughout the world on the actions required to minimize the damage.

All meetings with important agents were to be suspended.

In November 1962, KGB head Vladimir Semichastny approved a plan for the assassination of Golitsyn and other "particularly dangerous traitors" including Igor Gouzenko, Nikolay Khokhlov, and Bogdan Stashinsky.

The KGB made significant efforts to discredit Golitsyn by promoting disinformation that he was involved in illegal smuggling operations.

Golitsyn provided information about many famous Soviet agents including Kim Philby, Donald MacLean, Guy Burgess, John Vassall, double agent Aleksander Kopatzky who worked in Germany, and others.

While unable to identify some agents like Philby specifically by name, Golitsyn provided sufficient information that SIS was able to determine the culprits.

Bagley, having read Golitsyn's CIA file shortly after his and Kisevalter's June 1962 meetings with him, knew that what Nosenko had told them about KGB penetrations of Western intelligence services overlapped (and contradicted) what Golitsyn had told the CIA.

Bagley had thought this strange, because Nosenko and Golitsyn had worked in different parts of the highly compartmentalized KGB and therefore would not have been privy to the same information.

Gaitskell died after a sudden attack of lupus erythematosus, an autoimmune disorder, in 1963.

Golitsyn's claims about Wilson were believed in particular by the senior MI5 counterintelligence officer Peter Wright.

Although Wilson was repeatedly investigated by MI5 and cleared of this accusation, individuals within the service continued to believe that he was an agent of the KGB, and this belief played a part in coup plots against him.

In January of 1964, Yuri Nosenko, a Golitsyn-discrediting putative KGB officer who had defected "in place" to the CIA in 1962 in Geneva, returned there, once again as the ostensible security officer of a Soviet arms control delegation, and, as promised, recontacted his CIA case officers, Tennent H. Bagley and Russian-born George Kisevalter.

Nosenko proceeded to them that he now wanted to physically defect to the US (and leave his previously beloved wife and two daughters behind in Moscow) because he allegedly feared that the KGB was aware of his treason.

Bagley also did not believe that the KGB would have allowed Nosenko to travel to Geneva in 1964 if it suspected him of spying for the CIA.

He became an American citizen by 1984.

Golitsyn worked in the strategic planning department of the KGB in the rank of Major.