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Zoltán Dani was born on 23 July, 1956 in Kovin, AP Vojvodina, PR Serbia, Yugoslavia, is a Serbian military officer. Discover Zoltán Dani's Biography, Age, Height, Physical Stats, Dating/Affairs, Family and career updates. Learn How rich is he in this year and how he spends money? Also learn how he earned most of networth at the age of 67 years old?

Popular As N/A
Occupation N/A
Age 67 years old
Zodiac Sign Cancer
Born 23 July 1956
Birthday 23 July
Birthplace Kovin, AP Vojvodina, PR Serbia, Yugoslavia
Nationality Serbia

We recommend you to check the complete list of Famous People born on 23 July. He is a member of famous officer with the age 67 years old group.

Zoltán Dani Height, Weight & Measurements

At 67 years old, Zoltán Dani height not available right now. We will update Zoltán Dani's Height, weight, Body Measurements, Eye Color, Hair Color, Shoe & Dress size soon as possible.

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Dating & Relationship status

He is currently single. He is not dating anyone. We don't have much information about He's past relationship and any previous engaged. According to our Database, He has no children.

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Zoltán Dani Net Worth

His net worth has been growing significantly in 2023-2024. So, how much is Zoltán Dani worth at the age of 67 years old? Zoltán Dani’s income source is mostly from being a successful officer. He is from Serbia. We have estimated Zoltán Dani's net worth, money, salary, income, and assets.

Net Worth in 2024 $1 Million - $5 Million
Salary in 2024 Under Review
Net Worth in 2023 Pending
Salary in 2023 Under Review
House Not Available
Cars Not Available
Source of Income officer

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Timeline

1956

Zoltán Dani (Dani Zoltán; Zoltan Dani; Золтан Дани; 23 July 1956) is a politician, former officer of the Yugoslav army and former commander of the 3rd battery of the 250th Missile Brigade, which shot down a NATO F-117 Nighthawk near the village of Buđanovci on 27 March 1999, during the Kosovo War.

The hit was achieved with a S-125 surface-to-air missile system.

He was initially unknown to the public and aliased with the name Gvozden Đukić.

However, upon retiring from the military, he revealed his identity.

Dani claimed that his battery also shot down a NATO F-16.

Although NATO initially claimed the loss was due to "mechanical failure"; the F-16's pilot recounted that his aircraft was hit by a SAM.

Since retiring from military service, Dani has opened a bakery and a family restaurant in his native village Skorenovac.

1982

Based on experiences learned from the 1982 Lebanon War, constant relocation of all assets was key to survival of Dani's unit, the 3rd missile detachment of the 250th Yugoslav Air Defense Battalion.

1990

Although the SA-3 / "S-125M Neva" system is not a mobile SAM complex per design, its solid fueled missiles are transportable in near combat ready condition (in fact the Polish Armed Forces and Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces each created mobile versions of the SA-3 on T-72 and T-55 tank chassis respectively in the 1990s).

Therefore, Dani trained his SA-3 unit to achieve a 90-minute equipment break-down time with minimal lighting provided for better camouflage, one hour better than the standard time.

Further set-up and break-down time reductions were achieved by reducing the SA-3 unit's number of active 5P73 launchers and V-601M missiles to just 2x2 from the original 4x4 configuration.

This reduction in missile capability was justified, because of the expected strictly limited time slots and occasions where a Yugoslav SAM battery could open fire in face of a tremendous NATO Wild Weasel capability, with any hope of self-preservation.

1991

Radar sets obtained from confiscated Iraqi MiG-21 planes were planted around the SAM sites to serve as active emitter decoys, which diverted some anti-radiation missiles from the actual targets (dozens of Iraqi MiG-21/23 warplanes, sent to Yugoslavia for industrial overhaul, were seized in 1991, after Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait).

Retired SAM radar sets were used as optical decoys, left at well-known military bases to lure NATO warplanes to waste munition on worthless targets.

Owing to these measures, Dani's unit evaded 23 incoming HARM missiles, all of which impacted off-site with insignificant or zero damages.

General surveillance of NATO aircraft was provided by vintage P-18 radar sets, which used vacuum tubes and a large rotating Yagi antenna grid for meter-band illumination.

Under optimal conditions the Soviet-made P-18 was able to plot large-Radar cross-section aircraft from 125 to 200 km, depending on the target's size, but with a high range inaccuracy of several hundred meters.

Dani tuned his P-18 to the lowest possible frequency, hoping that meter band waves would reflect from the inside of targets, rendering stealth aircraft skin technology ineffective.

In practice his modified P-18 provided stable plot of F-117 movements from just 25 km, which was useful when combined with the comparatively short missile range of the SA-3 air defense complex.

Furthermore, the P-18 meter band radar could be kept almost constantly emitting, since most NATO radar warning receiver devices did not cover such a very low frequency band.

Dani initially claimed that four major capacitors had been replaced in the P-18, to further increase the wavelength.

However, he later admitted that no such modifications had been made, and that his story was a "marketing trick."

1999

The lean use of SAMs also became a necessity later on, as the initial 24 March 1999, 20:20 NATO air strike destroyed eighty reloads of ready to use V-601M missiles stored in two concrete vaults at the Jakovo SAM base.

Dani made it a strict field rule that the SA-3's UNV type fire control radar could only be turned on for a maximum of 2 x 20 seconds in combat, after which the battery's equipment must be immediately broken down and trucked to a prepared alternative launch site, whether or not any missile has been fired.

This rule proved essential, because other Yugoslav AAA units, emitting high-frequency radiation for any longer periods or forgetting to relocate, were hit by AGM-88 HARM missile counter-strikes from NATO aircraft, suffering radar equipment and personnel losses.

In order to train personnel to operate efficiently under such pressures, Dani obtained access to an "Accord" electronic signal simulator, which allowed the SA-3 radar and guidance crew practice combat scenarios based on imitated engagements.

Several soldiers were removed from position both during the pre-war practice drills and wartime guard shifts, when they proved unable to cope with the psychological stress of being targeted by enemy aircraft.

It was decided two missiles would be launched against any target near simultaneously, in order to maximize hit probability.

Unusually, launches were to be conducted against NATO aircraft that had already accomplished their ground strike missions and were about to leave Yugoslav airspace.

Their northern heading was pointing away from the direction of powerful NATO airborne Jammer sources, thereby allowing the SA-3's un-modernized UNV fire control radar set to operate with less interference.

Dani's mobility rule was strictly observed in his unit, with the trucks relocating frequently during the 78 days of the Kosovo War, as they constantly shuttled missiles, radars and equipment among the dozen alternative launch sites, most of them embankments left over from already phased out SA-2 (S-75) units.

On the particular night of the F-117 shootdown, 27 March 1999, Dani broke his own ruleset.

He had information about unfavorable Adriatic weather conditions and Yugoslav spies residing near Italian NATO airbases informed the Yugoslav Air Defense HQ about lack of EA-6 Prowler electronic Jammer and "Wild Weasel" anti-SAM aircraft launches during the late evening.

Therefore, any F-117s in the air on that night were alone in the dark, but with high crew morale due to their invulnerability during previous day's sorties.

In the evening, Dani's P-18 long-distance radar set malfunctioned at 19:05, almost the same time when four F-117s prepared for take-off from Aviano Air Base to attack targets in Belgrade.

The repaired P-18 radar returned to air by 19:50 and started to emit lower frequency.

Lt. Col. Dale Zelko's plane (tail number 82-0806) and three other F-117 flying northbound were acquired at 20:40 local time and so the SA-3 battery's fire control radar went on air.

The UNV radar emitted at high frequency for 2 x 20 seconds, but it was unable to obtain a lock on the targets.

Dani then ordered a third illumination round, against his own rules, but knowing that NATO lacked immediate counterstrike capability on the particular occasion.

2019

He is of Hungarian and Romanian ancestry; his paternal family are Székelys of Bukovina, like the majority of inhabitants of the village, settling Vojvodina in the late 19th century, while his mother was of Banat Romanian ancestry.