Yeo Jun Wei

Dickson Yeo Jun Wei ( born 22 February 1981), also known as Dickson Yeo, is a Singaporean convicted of espionage by the United States on behalf of the People's Republic of China (PRC, China).

He studied at National Junior College between 1998 and 1999.

Thereafter, he studied mass communications at the Oklahoma City University between 2004 and 2006.

He went on to the National University of Singapore (NUS) to study for a master's degree in South East Asian studies between 2009 and 2011.

He later started studying for a Doctor of Philosophy in Public Policy degree in 2015 at the NUS Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (LKYSPP).

While still receiving education at LKYSPP, Yeo made a presentation on Southeast Asia's political situation at Beijing in 2015 and was approached by individuals who claimed to be China-based think tanks.

They offered him money in exchange for political reports.

Yeo later learnt that at least four of these individuals were Chinese intelligence officers.

One of the intelligence officers later offered Yeo a contract to work with the People's Liberation Army.

Yeo refused to sign the contract, but he continued to assist and work for the intelligence service.

Between 2015 and 2019, Yeo had made frequent trips to China, meeting different operatives for at least 40 times.

In each trip, he would be processed in a separate office, away from the custom lines upon arrival to conceal his identity.

Yeo would also maintain communications with the officers via WeChat, through by changing different WeChat accounts and phones each time they communicated.

However, when Yeo was in United States, he was instructed not to communicate with the intelligence officers over concerns that their communications would be intercepted.

If need be, he would email them from a local coffee shop.

Yeo was also issued with a bank card to facilitate payments to his targets.

Yeo was tasked by the intelligence officers to provide them with information about international political, economic and diplomatic relations, and these pieces of information were to be of "non-public" in origin, and were referred to as "scuttlebutt".

In one of his meetings with the intelligence officers in China, he was specified to obtain non-public information about the U.S. Department of Commerce, artificial intelligence, and the Trump administration's trade war with China.

Yeo's focus was initially Southeast Asian centric, but subsequently was switched to United States.

By combing through LinkedIn, Yeo found Americans, including U.S. military and government employees with high-level security clearances, with resumes and job descriptions suggesting that they would have access to valuable non-public information which the Chinese intelligence officers seek.

After he identified individuals worth targeting, Yeo followed guidance he received from Chinese intelligence operatives regarding target recruitment methods, including identifying their vulnerabilities, such as dissatisfaction with work or financial difficulties.

Yeo then solicited them for non-public information and paid them to write reports.

Yeo told these American targets that the reports were for clients in Asia, without revealing that they were in fact destined for the Chinese government.

In 2015, through LinkedIn, Yeo spotted and contacted a civilian who was working with United States Air Force on the F-35B military aircraft programme.

The civilian held high-level security clearance, and was having financial trouble.

Yeo had him write a report.

The civilian also provided additional information about the geopolitical implications of the Japanese purchasing F-35 aircraft from the US which Yeo used to draft a report for his Chinese contacts.

In response to the job posting that Yeo had posted for his fake consulting company, a United States Army officer had sent in his resume.

The officer was assigned to the Pentagon which was US Army's headquarters at that time.

Yeo contacted the officer via a social networking app, and had met him on multiple occasions.

The officer confided in Yeo that he was traumatised by his military tours in Afghanistan.

In 2018, Yeo created a fake consulting company that used the same name as a prominent U.S. consulting firm that conducted public and government relations, and Yeo posted job advertisements under that company name.

He would receive more than 400 resumes, with 90 percent of them coming from U.S. military and government personnel with security clearances, and he passed resumes of interest to one of the Chinese intelligence operatives.

In 2019, he was granted a leave of absence from the programme.

Between January 2019 and July 2019, Yeo stayed in Washington, D.C. where he attended several events and speaking engagements at D.C. area think tanks.

Yeo also contacted several individuals from lobbying firms and defence contracting companies.

Yeo managed to successfully recruit multiple United States citizens to provide him with information.

On 24 July 2020, he pleaded guilty at the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of assisting China in collecting information in the United States without prior notification made to the United States Attorney General under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

After being released by the United States on 30 December 2020 and upon his return to Singapore, Yeo was subsequently additionally arrested and then further detained by Singapore's Internal Security Department (ISD) on 29 January 2021 for his spying activities, before he was conditionally released later that year on 14 December 2021 after they ascertained he no longer posed a threat to the intelligence of Singapore.

Yeo was born and raised in Singapore.