Lynn Hughes

Lynn Nettleton Hughes (born 1941) is a senior United States district judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, known for being removed from an unusual number of cases for showing bias and failing to follow federal rules.

Hughes has been removed from so many cases that appeals seeking his removal have been described by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit as "déjà vu all over again."

Born in Houston, Texas, Hughes received a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Alabama in 1963 and a Juris Doctor from the University of Texas School of Law in 1966.

He was in private practice in Houston from 1966 to 1979.

He was President of Southwest Resources in Houston from 1969 to 1970.

He was an adjunct professor at the South Texas College of Law from 1973 to 2003.

He was a judge on the 165th Judicial District, State of Texas from 1979 to 1980.

He was a judge on the 189th Judicial District, State of Texas from 1981 to 1985.

Hughes was nominated by President Ronald Reagan on October 16, 1985, to a seat on the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas vacated by Judge Robert J. O'Conor Jr. He was confirmed by the United States Senate on December 16, 1985, and received his commission on December 17, 1985.

He assumed senior status on February 12, 2023.

He was an adjunct professor at the University of Texas School of Law from 1990 to 1991.

He received a Master of Laws from the University of Virginia School of Law in 1992.

Since approximately 2008, Hughes has been a lecturer focusing on ethical issues for the 35,000-member American Association of Petroleum Geologists.

In the case of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Houston Funding II, Ltd. et al., Case Number H-11-2442 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2012), Donnicia Venters, a mother represented by the EEOC, claimed that she was fired from Houston Funding due to her request to be allowed to pump breastmilk upon her return to work after giving birth.

Houston Funding claimed that it had fired Venters for abandoning her job for over two months after giving birth.

Venters sued Houston Funding, alleging that the company had discriminated against her based on her sex.

Citing several previous District Court opinions which had already ruled on the issue, Judge Hughes explained that breastfeeding is not covered by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.

In the ruling, Hughes writes, "Even if the company's claim that she was fired for abandonment is meant to hide the real reason – she wanted to pump breast milk – lactation is not pregnancy, childbirth or a related medical condition. She gave birth on Dec. 11, 2009. After that day, she was no longer pregnant and her pregnancy-related conditions ended. Firing someone because of lactation or breast-pumping is not sex discrimination."

Hughes was overruled by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals which held that Venters had established a prima facie case of sex discrimination under Title VII.

Critically, the Fifth Circuit found Hughes to be so biased that it took the unusual step of reassigning the case to a district court judge on remand.

Upon dismissing the indictment in a case titled United States v. Swenson, Judge Hughes sharply criticized a female prosecutor on the case, saying "It was a lot simpler when you guys wore dark suits white shirts and navy ties . . . we didn’t let girls do it in the old days."

The Fifth Circuit reversed, and stated that Judge Hughes' comments were "demeaning, inappropriate and beneath the dignity of a federal judge."

The Fifth Circuit reassigned the case to another judge, finding Hughes to be too biased.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the judge in an employment discrimination case and took the rare step of reassigning it to another judge and said this:

From the outset of these suits, the district judge’s actions evinced a prejudgment of Miller’s claims.

At the beginning of the Initial Case Management Conference, the judge dismissed sua sponte Miller’s claims against TSUS and UHS, countenancing no discussion regarding the dismissal.

Later in the same conference, the judge responded to the parties’ opposition to consolidating Miller’s two cases by telling Miller’s counsel, “I will get credit for closing two cases when I crush you.

. . . How will that look on your record?”

And things went downhill from there.

The court summarily denied Miller’s subsequent motion for reconsideration, denied Miller’s repeated requests for leave to take discovery (including depositions of material witnesses), and eventually granted summary judgment in favor of SHSU and UHD, dismissing all claims.

Miller now appeals the district court’s rulings and asks for her cases to be reassigned on remand.

Mindful of the fundamental right to fairness in every proceeding—both in fact, and in appearance, we REVERSE, REMAND, and direct that these cases be REASSIGNED to a new district judge for further proceedings.

The Fifth Circuit also notes that previous to the Miller case Hughes handled another case, McKoy, in a similar fashion – which also resulted in the case being similarly reversed and remanded.

In support of her position, Miller refers us to McCoy v. Energy XXI GOM, LLC, 695 F. App’x 750 (5th Cir. 2017).

In that case, the same district judge [, i.e. Hughes,] imposed substantially similar discovery restrictions to those imposed here.

Id. at 753.

Specifically, the district judge denied almost all requests for discovery and “permitted only the deposition of [the plaintiff]” and “the disclosure by the defendants of certain documents pertaining to the specific [object] at issue,” certain photographs, and a video.

Id. On appeal, we reversed and remanded the case on summary judgment grounds, finding genuine issues of material fact existed, even with the limited discovery that had been permitted.

Id. at 758.

But we also noted that “[t]he district court abused its discretion in refusing to allow [the plaintiff] to conduct sufficient discovery.