Cofer Black

A native of Ridgefield, Connecticut, Black completed his BA at the University of Southern California in 1973.

The next year he earned a master's degree in international relations, also at USC.

He then was accepted to a doctoral program at USC, but left in 1975 to join the CIA.

At the CIA, Black trained for the clandestine service and volunteered for Africa based on his knowledge of the region from childhood travels with his father across the continent.

Initially, he worked as a case officer in Lusaka, Zambia during the Rhodesian Bush War.

He then transferred to Somalia, where he served for two years during the conflict between Ethiopians and Somalis.

He worked in South Africa during the National Party government's war against guerrilla movements opposing the apartheid system.

While assigned to Kinshasa, Zaire, Black was involved in the Reagan Administration's covert action program to arm anti-communist guerrillas in neighboring Angola.

In 1993, Black transferred from London to Khartoum, Sudan, where he served as CIA station chief until 1995.

This was at a low point in U.S.-Sudanese relations, due to the latter's sponsorship of terrorism and the harboring of Al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden.

Black oversaw the collection of human intelligence (HUMINT) on terrorist cells and support structures; toward the end of his tenure, he was targeted by Al Qaeda for assassination (see Woodward, Bush at War, p. 9).

Black was also responsible for the collection of intelligence that led to the 1994 capture of the terrorist known as Carlos the Jackal.

In 1995, Black was named the Task Force Chief in the Near East and South Asia Division.

From June 1998 through June 1999, he served as the Deputy Chief of the Latin America Division.

In December 1998, CIA chief Tenet "declared war" on Osama bin Laden.

In June 1999 Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet named Black director of the CIA's Counterterrorist Center (CTC).

In this capacity, Black served as the CIA Director's Special Assistant for Counterterrorism as well as the National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism.

Black's promotion was a part of Tenet's "grand plan" for dealing with Al Qaeda.

Black was the operational chief in charge of this effort.

Tenet also put "Richard," one of his own assistants, in charge of the CTC's bin Laden tracking unit.

Early in 1999 Tenet "ordered the CTC to begin a 'baseline' review of the CIA's operational strategy against bin Laden."

In the spring, he "demanded 'a new, comprehensive plan of attack' against bin Laden and his allies."

The CTC had produced a "comprehensive plan of attack" against bin Laden and previewed the new strategy to senior CIA management by the end of July 1999.

By mid-September, it had been briefed to CIA operational level personnel, the NSA, the FBI, and other partners.

The strategy was referred to as "the Plan."

"... [Cofer] Black and his new bin Laden unit wanted to 'project' into Afghanistan, to 'penetrate' bin Laden's sanctuaries. They described their plan as military officers might. They sought to surround Afghanistan with secure covert bases for CIA operations—as many bases as they could arrange. Then they would mount operations from each of the platforms, trying to move inside Afghanistan and as close to bin Laden as they could to recruit agents and to attempt capture operations. Black wanted recruitments and he wanted to develop commando or paramilitary strike teams made up of officers and men who could 'blend' into the region's Muslim populations."

Parallel with these developments, in November–December 1999, Mohamed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Ziad Jarrah, and Nawaf al-Hazmi visited Afghanistan, where they were selected for the "planes operation" that was to become known as 9/11.

Intelligence collection efforts on bin Laden and Al Qaeda increased significantly from 1999.

"By 9/11," said Tenet, "a map would show that these collection programs and human [reporting] networks were in place in such numbers as to nearly cover Afghanistan."

Working with a Malaysian security unit, the CIA watched al-Hazmi and his companion Khalid al-Mihdhar as they attended a January 2000 Al Qaeda conference in Kuala Lumpur, later determined to be where decisions about the "planes operation" were made.

According to an internal CIA report on the performance of the agency prior to the 9/11 attacks, Black was criticized for not informing the FBI that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar had subsequently entered the United States.

In addition, the 9/11 Commission found that while Black testified before Congress's Joint Inquiry into 9/11 that the FBI had access to information on the two hijackers, the 9/11 Commission found no such evidence of this.

The CIA increasingly concentrated its resources on counter-terrorism, so that resources for this particular activity increased sharply.

Some of the Plan's more modest aspirations were translated into action.

Black still headed the CTC at the time of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center.

During the summer of 2001, Tenet, Black, and one of Black's top assistants—"Rich B" (i.e. "Richard")—were active in conveying the dangers of Al Qaeda to the new Bush administration.

At a meeting with National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and others on July 10, 2001, "Rich" predicted a "spectacular" terrorist attack against US interests "in the coming weeks or months" ... "Multiple and simultaneous attacks are possible."

After the meeting, "Rich and Cofer congratulated each other," feeling that at last the CIA had gotten the full attention of the administration.

Joseph Cofer Black is an American former CIA officer who served as director of the Counterterrorism Center in the years surrounding the September 11th attacks, and was later appointed Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State Department by President George W. Bush, serving until his resignation in 2004.

Prior to his roles combatting terrorism, Black served across the globe in a variety of roles with the Directorate of Operations at the CIA.